26th February and two days to go to the Nova financial year-end for 2026. This, whilst the Annual Financial Statements (AFS) for year-end 2025 have still not been published

We imagine that the AFS will be published by Saturday 28th because, for any normal company, it would be highly embarrassing for the Directorate if such a situation like arrival of a new year-end when the AFS for the previous year-end have still not been published, were to occur

Is Nova a “normal” company?

No, It’s an unlisted company with shareholders and its purpose is to deliver the Sharemax business rescue out of which it originated and achieve repayment of the Nova Debentures to the former Sharemax investors. Normally, the company Chair and Board would be at pains to demonstrate accountability to the shareholders but not in this case

The company has two levels of Shareholder:

* The A & B Class shareholders who are all Directors of the company. (as far as we know) That’s an insider cabal and no accountability is necessary. They acquired their shares out of a provision in the SoA whereby all Sharemax shares for which the individual underlying investors did not make a formal choice as to conversion to either of Nova Shares or Nova Debentures, would by default be assigned to the directors of the company and the investors who did not make a choice would become Debenture Holders by default

* The D Class shareholders being those Sharemax investors who did opt to convert their Sharemax asset to shares in Nova. D Class shares carry no voting rights and thus the Chair and the Board can disregard them altogether and probably do

Thus, we think that there is a chance that the 2025 AFS may not be published by Saturday 28th February and if so, that company Chair Myburgh will have already prepared one of his self-serving personal law-bending interpretations (possibly even backed by a – paid for – legal opinion) which justifies the non-publication

So, in the absence of the 2025 AFS, what is our level of information about and understanding of, the affairs of the company? Not very good considering that the last published AFS, for 2024, will have contained information that was relevant to activities in 2023 and thus, it could be said that we have had no formal information from Nova for two years (discount the not very informative Communiqu?? issued in December 2025) while they continue to run the company, and the prospects for Debenture Holder repayment, into the ground

And, underneath this, we have become aware of apparent court actions involving Nova

There was, apparently, a court session today (26 February) which reportedly, is an application for liquidation of Nova or one or more of it’s subsidiary companies

We stress that this and related information herein is at this stage, unverified. But, we think that, because of the implications of such court action, if indeed taking pace, the Debenture Holders should be aware of it

Of course, the Nova Chair and Board will not inform on this. They don’t do communication! At best, we might get some passing comment in a future Communqu? (don’t hold your breath) or in the 2026 AFS, if and when they are eventually published

Who might the applicants be? Maybe one or more of those creditors who have been at the losing end of Nova defaults over the last years?

* Quattro Security Services who wanted liquidation back in 2024 for Nova default under a contract for hygiene services at a number of malls. Has Nova defaulted again, this time under the settlement arrangement arrived at to prevent the liquidation and give Nova time to repay the outstanding debt?

* Bright Light Solar who took Nova to court in 2025 (see: <www.ndcag.co.za/go/202506191> www.ndcag.co.za/go/202506191,) over default in payment for solar installations at some of the commercial properties? Nova properties mentioned in a message on a Brightstar application are Flora Centre (but see below), Tarentaal/Courtside and the Village Mall (both already lost out of the Beneficio loan fiasco), Carletonville Centre (pledged under the Capitec loan – see below), Witbank Highveld and Waterfall

* Are there other creditors who are also taking legal action? We would not be surprised if that is indeed the case?

Then, there is the Flora Centre matter (see our 28 November post here: <www.ndcag.co.za/2025/11/> www.ndcag.co.za/2025/11/) which is apparently, going to court on 9 March. It seems that Capitec are going ahead with their application for liquidation of Flora Centre Investments (Pty) Limited, the Nova subsidiary that is the registered owner of Flora Centre

If this does go ahead and given the Board’s sacrificial and in defiance of CIPC’s asset disposal embargo, offering of Carletonville and Rangeview Centres in settlement – what will the outcome be?

We stress again, we have not verified any if this information and await detail and clarity

We’ve had no word from CIPC on Flora Centre following our email to them last year in which we suggested that the Nova action to circumvent the ban on disposal of fixed assets is now actionable

Meantime, we are aware that Nova debenture Trustee, JP Tromp, has addressed Willem van Niekerk, Chair of the Nova audit committee, and copied the other directors, on why the audit of the ’25 AFS has not yet been competed and when the AFS will be published

As regards Tromp’s investigative and revelatory activities, he has informed us that February is a very busy time for him and his business and that he will be resuming his Nova and Debenture related posts in his business web site at <www.carian.co.za> www.carian.co.za > Nova Debenture Trust in March

26 Februarie en twee dae oor tot die Nova-finansiële jaareinde vir 2026. Dit terwyl die Jaarlikse Finansiële State (Jaarstate) vir die jaareinde van 2025 nog nie gepubliseer is nie

Ons verbeel ons dat die Jaarstate teen Saterdag 28ste gepubliseer sal word, want vir enige normale maatskappy sou dit ‘n grrot verleentheid vir die Direktoraat wees as so ‘n situasie soos die aankoms van ‘n nuwe jaareinde sou plaasvind wanneer die state vir die vorige jaar nog steeds nie gepubliseer is nie

Is Nova ‘n “normale” maatskappy?

Nee, dit is ‘n ongenoteerde maatskappy met aandeelhouers en die doel daarvan is om die Sharemax besigheidsredding waaruit dit ontstaan ​​het, te bewerkstellig en die terugbetaling van die Nova-skuldbriewe aan die voormalige Sharemax-beleggers te bewerkstellig. Normaalweg sou die maatskappy se voorsitter en direksie moeite doen om aanspreeklikheid teenoor die aandeelhouers te demonstreer, maar nie in hierdie geval nie

Die maatskappy het twee vlakke van aandeelhouers:

– Die A- en B-klas-aandeelhouers wat almal direkteure van die maatskappy is (sovêr ons weet). Dit is ‘n binnekring en geen aanspreeklikheid is nodig nie. Hulle het hul aandele verkry uit ‘n bepaling in die besigheidsreddingsplan Reëlingskena waarvolgens alle Sharemax-aandele waarvoor die individuele onderliggende beleggers nie ‘n formele keuse gemaak het oor omskakeling na Nova-aandele of Nova-skuldbriewe nie, by verstek aan die direkteure van die maatskappy toegeken sou word en die beleggers wat nie ‘n formele keuse gemaak het nie, by verstek skuldbriefhouers sou word.

– Die D-klas-aandeelhouers is daardie Sharemax-beleggers wat wel gekies het om hul Sharemax-bate tot in aandele in Nova om te skakel. D-klas-aandele dra geen stemreg nie en dus kan die Voorsitter en Raad hulle heeltemal ignoreer en waarskynlik doen wel so

Dus, dink dons at daar ‘n kans is dat die 2025 Jaarstate dalk nie teen Saterdag 28 Februarie gepubliseer sal word nie en dat maatskappyvoorsitter, Myburgh, reeds een van sy selfsugtige persoonlike wetsbuigende interpretasies al voorberei het (moontlik selfs gerugsteun deur ‘n regsopinie – dalk waarvoor betaal is met matskappy fondse) wat die nie-publikasie regverdig

So, in die afwesigheid van die 2025 Jaarstate wat is ons vlak van inligting oor en begrip van, die sake en stand van die maatskappy? Nie baie goed nie, as in ag geneem word dat die laaste gepubliseerde AFS, vir 2024, inligting sou bevat het wat relevant was tot aktiwiteite in 2023, en dus kan gesê word dat ons vir twee jaar geen formele inligting van Nova ontvang het nie (ignoreer die nie-baie insiggewende Communiqué uitgereik in Desember 2025) terwyl hulle voortgaan om die maatskappy, en die vooruitsigte vir die terugbetaling van die skuldbriefhouers, tot in die grond te dryf.

En onder hierdie het ons nou bewus geword van oënskynlike hofaksies teen Nova

Daar was blykbaar vandag (26 Februarie) ‘n hofsitting wat na bewering ‘n aansoek vir likwidasie van Nova of een of meer van sy filiale is

Ons beklemtoon dat hierdie en verwante inligting hierin op hierdie stadium ongeverifieer is. Maar ons dink dat, as gevolg van die implikasies van sodanige hofaksie, indien dit wel plaasvind, die skuldbriefhouers daarvan bewus moet wees.

Natuurlik sal die Nova-voorsitter en -raad nie hieroor inlig nie. Hulle doen nie kommunikasie nie! Op sy beste kan ons dalk ‘n paar terloopse kommentaar in ‘n toekomstige kommunikasie kry (maar moenie asem ophou nie) of in die 2026 Jaarstate, indien en wanneer dit uiteindelik gepubliseer word?

Wie mag die aansoekers wees? Miskien een of meer van daardie gewone verdagtes wat die afgelope paar jaar aan die verloorkant van Nova-wanbetalings was?

– Quattro Security Services wat in 2024 likwidasie wou hê vir Nova se wanbetaling onder ‘n kontrak vir higiënedienste by ‘n aantal winkelsentrums. Het Nova weer in gebreke gebly, hierdie keer onder die skikkingsreëling wat bereik is om die likwidasie te voorkom en Nova tyd te gee om die uitstaande skuld terug te betaal?

– Bright Light Solar wat Nova in 2025 hof toe geneem het (sien: www.ndcag.co.za/go/202506191,) oor wanbetaling vir sonkraginstallasies by sommige van die kommersiële eiendomme? Nova-eiendomme wat in ‘n boodskap op ‘n Brightstar-aansoek genoem word, is Flora Centre (maar sien hieronder), Tarentaal/Courtside en die Village Mall (albei reeds verloor uit die Beneficio-leningsfiasko), Carletonvile Centre (belowe onder die Capitec-lening – sien hieronder), Witbank Highveld en Waterfall.

– Is daar ander krediteure wat ook regstappe doen? Ons sal nie verbaas wees as dit inderdaad die geval is nie?

Dan is daar die Flora Centre-saak (sien ons plasing van 28 November hier: www.ndcag.co.za/2025/11/) wat blykbaar op 9 Maart hof toe gaan. Dit lyk asof Capitec voortgaan met hul aansoek om likwidasie van Flora Centre Investments (Pty) Limited, die Nova-filiaal wat die geregistreerde eienaar van Flora Centre is.

Indien dit wel voortgaan en gegewe die Raad se opoffering en in weerwil van CIPC se bateverkopingsembargo, aanbod van Carletonville- en Rangeview-sentrums as skikking – wat sal die uitkoms wees?

Ons het geen woord van CIPC hieroor ontvang na aanleiding van ons e-pos aan hulle waarin ons voorgestel het dat die Nova-aksie om die verbod op die verkoop van vaste bates te omseil nou aksievatbaar is nie.

Intussen is ons bewus daarvan dat Nova-skuldbrieftrustee, JP Tromp vir Willem van Niekerk, voorsitter van die Nova-ouditkomitee, aangespreek het asook die ander direkteure oor waarom die oudit van die ’25 AFS nog nie voltooi is nie en wanneer die Jaarstate gepubliseer sal word

Wat Tromp se ondersoekende en onthullende aktiwiteite betref, het hy ons meegedeel dat Februarie ‘n baie besige tyd vir hom en sy besigheid is en dat hy sy Nova- en skuldbriefverwante poste op sy besigheidswebwerf by www.carian.co.za <www.carian.co.za> > Nova Debenture Trust in Maart sal hervat.

Ons kyk gereeld na die Nova-webwerf vir enige opdaterings en nuus (nie dat dit gereeld voorkom nie: slegs twee in die afgelope jaar) en hou tans ook dop vir die publikasie van die 2025 Jaarlikse Finansiële State

Op Donderdag 15 Januarie kon ons nie konnekteer nie en is ons via ‘n opspringboodskap op die skerm in kennis gestel dat: “Daar was ‘n kritieke fout op hierdie webwerf”. Teen Maandagoggend was toegang steeds nie moontlik nie

Wat beteken dit? Wat moet persone wat enige belang in Nova het hiervan maak? Wie sou hierdie belangstellendes wees? Die skuldbriewe en aandeelhouers natuurlik, maar ook ander krediteure, diensverskaffers, hul bankiers en moontlik selfs potensiële beleggers, hoe onwaarskynlik dit ook al mag wees

Hoe krities is hierdie gebeurtenis?

Was dit bloot ‘n tegniese saak? Is die maatskappy se internetdiens deur die betrokke diensverskaffer afgesny en, indien ja, waarom?

Of is dit deel van ‘n groot ontwikkeling of verandering wat nog gepubliseer moet word?
Wat beteken dit? Wat moet persone wat enige belang in Nova het hiervan maak? Wie sou hierdie belanghebbende persone wees? Die skuldbriewe en aandeelhouers natuurlik, maar ook ander krediteure, diensverskaffers, hul bankiers en moontlik selfs potensiële beleggers, hoe onwaarskynlik dit ook al mag wees

Of was dit deel van ‘n groot ontwikkeling of verandering wat nog nie gepubliseer is nie?

‘n Mens sou nie weet sonder enige kommunikasie van Nova nie, en dit sou nie onregverdig wees om te sê dat dit gelyk het of die skuldbriefhouers dalk weer eens in die duister gelaat word nie

Ons het Maandagoggend vir Nova ‘n e-pos gestuur na hul generiese e-posadres – gemerk vir die aandag van Raadsvoorsitter Myburgh – en gevra vir die rede waarom die webwerf ontoeganklik is

‘n Generiese antwoord is ontvang van ‘n persoon in die administrasie, wat verklaar dat die rede ‘n tegniese probleem was en kort na ontvangs van die e-pos was toegang tot die webwerf weer moontlik

Dit besweer nie ons kommer oor die moontlikheid van nog ‘n gebeurtenis wat dui op, eerstens, onstabiliteit binne die maatskappy, tweedens, dat niemand by Nova, so lyk dit, daaraan gedink het om ‘n openbare verklaring oor die onderbreking te maak nie en derdens, dat die generiese antwoord dalk ‘n dekmantelstorie is vir ‘n meer ernstige onderliggende situasie, waarvan die besonderhede nog bekend gemaak moet word

Paranoia? Gegewe die onthulde geskiedenis van aksies wat die skuldbriefhouers benadeel het sedert 2012, sal enige negatiewe gebeurtenis met agterdog bejeën word

Die e-posse waarna verwys word, kan hier gelees word: www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260121-2 en hier: www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260121-1

We regularly check the Nova web site for any updates and news (not that these occur frequently: only two in the last year) and are currently also watching for publication of the 2025 Annual Financial Statements

On Thursday 15 January, we were unable to connect and we were informed via an on-screen pop-up message that: “There has been a critical error on this web site”. As of Monday morning access was still not possible

What does this mean? What are persons who have any interest in Nova to make of this? Who would, these interested persons be? The Debenture- and Shareholders of course but also other creditors, service providers, their bankers and possibly even potential investors, however unlikely that might be

How critical is this event?

Was it merely a technical matter? Has the company’s internet service been cut by the relevant service provider and if so, why?

Or, is it part of a major development or change that has yet to be publicized?

One wouldn’t know in the absence of any communication coming out of Nova, and it would not be unfair to state that it looked like the Debenture Holders were, perhaps, being left in the dark – yet again

We emailed Nova on Monday morning at their generic email address – marked for attention of Board Chair Myburgh – asking for the reason why the web site is inaccessible

A generic reply was received from a person in the administration, stating that the reason was a technical issue and shortly after receipt of the mail, access to the web site was again possible

It does not allay our concerns as to the possibility of yet another event that points to, firstly, instability within the company, secondly, that no one at Nova, it seems, thought to make a public statement on the outage and thirdly, that the generic reply might be a cover story for a more serious underlying situation, details of which have yet to be revealed

Paranoia? Given revealed history of actions detrimental to the Debenture Holders, since 2012, any negative event will be viewed with suspicion

The emails referred to can be read here:
<www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260121-2> www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260121-2
and here:
<www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260121-1> www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260121-1

We stated the book value as per the ’24 AFS for the Del Judor Centre as 17.9 million. This figure should read 179.0 million

Our apologies. We trust that no Del Judor (Highveld Witbank) Debenture Holder got heart palpitations on seeing the incorrect value

This means a change to the figures that we set out in the post and these now read:

Already lost or at risk: 192.7m
(Village Mall, Courtside, Carletonville & Carnival)

Zambezi and the Villa: 1,289.0 billion

Remaining commercial properties
Del Judor: 179.0.m
Flora Centre: 217.4m
Waterglen: 281.8m

Total remaining commercial assets: 678.2m. Up from 517.1m as previously stated, although, in the bigger picture and given the 1,963.9 billion of commercial property related debentures that must still be repaid, the slight increase doesn’t have much meaning

Again, apologies for the error

Ons het die boekwaarde volgens die ’24 AFS vir die Del Judor-sentrum as 17.9 miljoen aangegee. Hierdie syfer behoort 179.0 miljoen te wees

Ons vra om verskoning. Ons vertrou dat geen Del Judor (Highveld Witbank) Skuldbriefhouer hartkloppings gekry het toe hulle die verkeerde waarde gesien het nie

Dit beteken ‘n verandering aan die syfers wat ons in die plasing uiteengesit het, en dit lui nou:

Reeds verlore of in gevaar: 192.7 miljoen
(Village Mall, Courtside, Carletonville & Carnival)

Zambezi en die Villa: 1 289,0 miljard

Oorblywende kommersiële eiendomme
Del Judor: 179,0 miljoen
Flora-sentrum: 217,4 miljoen
Waterglen: 281,8 miljoen

Totale oorblywende kommersiële bates: 678.2 miljoen. Op vanaf 517.1 miljoen soos voorheen genoem, hoewel, in die groter prentjie en gegewe die 1 963.9 miljard aan kommersiële eiendomsverwante skuldbriewe wat nog terugbetaal moet word, die relatief klein toename nie veel betekenis het nie

Weereens, verskoning vir die fout

Na twee jaar van stilte het Nova Property ‘n Kommunikasie gedateer 11 Desember gepubliseer, wat ‘n opdatering gee oor die status van die eiendomme wat in die portefeulje oorbly

Dit kan hier gelees word: novapropertygroup.co.za/index.php/communiques/#flipbook-df_6497/1/

Dit verskaf inligting oor die nege oorblywende kommersiële eiendomme in die portefeulje, insluitend:

– inligting oor die Amogela/Liberty Mall in Welkom wat in 2021 verkoop is en in Desember van daardie jaar in die naam van die nuwe eienaar oorgedra is maar waarvoor betaling nooit ontvang is nie (Sien Nova Debenture Trustee JP Tromp se uiteensetting oor hierdie eiendom by www.carian.co.za/post/debentures-linked-to-amogela-mall-liberty-mall )

– die voorlopige likwidasie van Flora Centre weens wanbetaling op ‘n lening, maar sonder enige melding van hul plan, in weerwil van die CIPC-embargo op die verkoop van eiendomsbates, om die Carletonville- en Carnival Centre-eiendomme in skikking aan te bied (op te offer) en sodoende die likwidasie te ontsnap en die waardevoller eiendom te behou (Sien ons plasing van 28 November oor Flora Centre op beide die webwerf en die Facebook-blad)

Dit is betekenisvol dat hulle geen inligting verskaf oor die oorblywende (bly hulle inderdaad op die boeke?) sewe residensiële ontwikkelingseiendomme soos ook die geval was in hul vorige kommunikasie van Desember 2023 nie (alhoewel daardie een wel inhoud oor Theresapark gehad het – welke vals inhoud slegs teenwoordig was om punte te verdien oor die CIPC-bateverkopingsembargo wat, volgens hulle, ontwikkelingsfinansiering ingeperk het)

Wat sê dit eintlik vir ons? Miskien stel ons e-pos wat aan Cuma Zwane van CIPC gestuur is, waarin ons ‘n afskrif van die Kommuniké aan hom gestuur het, wat die algemene vlak van aanvaarding en geloof sal wees. Lees hier: www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-1

Natuurlik, ‘n Kommunikasie, waarvan die doel duidelik is om ‘n prentjie te bied van ‘n lewensvatbare maatskappy wat in die belang van die Skuldbriefhouers – sy primêre skuldeiser – werk (en hopelik daardie Sharemax-beleggers wat in 2010/11 gekies het om aandeelhouers te word) dien geen nut wanneer die laaste jaarlikse finansiële state wat gepubliseer is (vir die einde van 2024) ‘n prentjie toon wat gebaseer is op die maatskappyinligting wat soveel as drie jaar oud is – wat beteken verouderd. Die 2025-jaarlikse finansiële state is nog nie gepubliseer nie en Nova gaan voort (in die Kommunikasie) om sy standpunt te regverdig dat die Maatskappywet nie publikasie binne ses maande na die einde van die finansiële jaar vereis nie

Ons gebruik hierdie plasing om ‘n prentjie te skets van die vlak van risiko wat die maatskappy en die Skuldbriefhouers tans in die gesig staar:

Eerstens, hou in gedagte dat die “Missing 414 million” – die eiendomme is wat voorheen verkoop is sonder ooreenstemmende skuldbriefterugbetaling (Sien JP Tromp se plasing hieroor by www.carian.co.za/post/the-missing-r-414-694-327) in die nastrewing van Nova se “Optimal Value Enhancement for Debenture Holders through redeployment of proceeds of disposed of properties ito Nova’s Capital Growth Strategy” – ‘n strategie wat klaaglik misluk het, miskien doelbewus!

Van die nege kommersiële eiendomme wat in die portefeulje oorbly, gebaseer op die ’24 AFS-inhoud (maar nou twee jaar verouderd), is die volgende reeds weg of in gevaar:

Village Mall: ’24 AFS-waarde = 42.6 miljoen – Die eiendom is in beslag geneem en verkoop ingevolge ‘n hofuitspraak in die Beneficio-lenings saak
Courtside Centre: 66.6 miljoen – ook verlore uit die Beneficio-lening
Carletonville Centre: 53.8 miljoen – moontlik verlore onder Nova se wanbetalings van die Flora Centre-lening en aangebied aan die finansieringsbank as gedeeltelike skikking
Carnival Centre: 29.7 miljoen – soortgelyk aan Carletonville

Totale batewaarde verlore of in gevaar: 192.7 miljoen

Voeg hierby die skynbaar hopelose/”basket case” van:

Zambezi/Tshwane China Mall: 539.0 miljoen
The Villa: 750.0 miljoen

Batewaarde in gevaar: 1 289.0 miljard

Klik hier vir ‘n onlangse Daily Investor-artikel oor Zambezi: www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-3

Klik hier vir ‘n video oor Die Villa-dop (of, die “eyesore”, waaroor daar gereelde mediaklagtes is): www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-2

Watter bates sal beskikbaar bly om uiteindelik skuldbriefterugbetaling te verskaf?

Del Judor: 17.9 miljoen
Flora-sentrum: 217.4 miljoen
Waterglen: 281.8 miljoen

Totale oorblywende kommersiële bates: 517.1 miljoen

Sal hierdie waarde van bates ooit in staat wees om terugbetaling van kommersiële eiendomsverwante skuldbriewe ter waarde van 1 963,9 miljard (volgens die ’24 AFS) te verskaf?

(Ons het die residensiële ontwikkelingseiendomme en verwante skuldbriewe in hierdie plasing uitgesluit weens die minimale inligting in die ’24 AFS en die totale gebrek aan enige inligting in die jongste Kommunikasie)

So, wat is Nova se vooruitsigte vir hierdie jaar? Kan enigiemand argumenteer dat die maatskappy lewensvatbaar en ‘n lopende saak (going concern) is? Wat kan ons verwag om te sien in die ’25 AFS – wanneer hulle uiteindelik vrygestel word? Sal ‘n ontleding van die AFS waarskynlik weereens die mening lewer dat die maatskappy insolvent is?

En die belangrikste van alles: is daar enige moontlikheid, al hoe skraal, dat die oorblywende skuldbriewe (2.2 miljard vanaf die ’24 AFS) ooit terugbetaal sal word?

After two years of silence, Nova Property has published a Communiqué dated 11 December, giving an update on the status of the properties that remain in the portfolio
It can be read here: <novapropertygroup.co.za/index.php/communiques/#flipbook-df_6497/1/> novapropertygroup.co.za/index.php/communiques/#flipbook-df_6497/1/
It provides information on the nine remaining commercial properties in the portfolio including:

* information on the Amogela/Liberty Mall in Welkom which was sold in 2021and transferred into the name of the new owner in December of that year but for which payment has never been received (See Nova Debenture Trustee JP Tromp’s exposé on this property at <www.carian.co.za/post/debentures-linked-to-amogela-mall-liberty-mal l> www.carian.co.za/post/debentures-linked-to-amogela-mall-liberty-mall )

* the provisional liquidation of Flora Centre because of default on a loan but without any mention of their ploy, in defiance of the CIPC embargo on property asset disposal, to offer(sacrifice) the Carletonville and Carnival Centre properties in settlement and thus escape the liquidation and retain the more valuable property (See our 28 November post on Flora Centre in both the web site and the Facebook page)

Significantly, if provides no information on the remaining (do they indeed remain on the books?) seven residential development properties as was also the case in their previous Communiqué of December 2023 (although that one did have content on Theresapark – which spurious content was only present to score points about the CIPC asset disposal embargo having, they said, canned development finance)

What does it actually tell us? Perhaps our email sent to Cuma Zwane at CIPC, forwarding a copy of the Communiqué to him, states what the general level of acceptance and belief will be. Read here: <www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-1> www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-1

Of course, a Communiqué, the purpose of which is, clearly, to present a picture of a viable company working in the interests of the Debenture Holders – its primary creditor – (and hopefully, those Sharemax investors who opted to become Shareholders back in 2010/11) serves no point when the last annual financial statements published (for year-end 2024) show a picture which is based on the company information that is as much as three years old – meaning out of date. The 2025 AFS are as yet, unpublished and Nova continues (in the Communique) to justify its stance that the Companies Act does not require publication within six months after financial year-end

We use this post to sketch a picture of the level of risk that the company and the Debenture Holders are currently facing:

Firstly, bear in mind the “Missing 414 million” being the properties previously sold without corresponding debenture repayment (See JP Tromp’s post on this at <www.carian.co.za/post/the-missing-r-414-694-327> www.carian.co.za/post/the-missing-r-414-694-327) in pursuit of Nova’s “Optimal Value Enhancement for Debenture Holders through redeployment of proceeds of disposed of properties ito Nova’s Capital Growth Strategy” – a strategy that has failed miserably, perhaps deliberately so!

Of the nine commercial properties that remain in the portfolio, based on the ’24 AFS content (but two years out of date now), the following are already gone or at risk:

Village Mall: ’24 AFS value = 42.6m – attached under the defaulted Beneficio loan judgements
Courtside Centre: 66.6m – also lost out of the Beneficio loan
Carletonville Centre: 53.8m – potentially lost under Nova’s defaulted Flora Centre loan and offered to the financing bank as part settlement
Carnival Centre: 29.7m – likewise as for Carletonville

Total asset value lost or at risk: 192.7m

Add to these the apparently hopeless/basket cases of:

Zambezi/Tshwane China Mall: 539.0m
The Villa: 750.0m

Asset value at risk: 1,289.0 Billion

Click here for a recent Daily Investor article on Zambezi: <www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-3> www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-3
Click here for a video on The Villa shell (or, the eyesore, about which there are frequent media complaints): <www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-2> www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-2

What assets will be left available to eventually provide Debenture repayment?

Del Judor: 17.9m
Flora Centre: 217.4m
Waterglen: 281.8m

Total remaining commercial assets: 517.1m

Is this value of assets ever going to be able to provide repayment of commercial property related debentures to the value of 1,963.9 BilIion as per the ’24 AFS?

(We Have excluded addressing the residential development properties and related debentures in this post due to the minimal information contained in the ’24 AFS and the total lack of any information in the latest Communiqué)

So, what are Nova’s prospects for this year? Can anyone argue that the company is viable and a going concern? What can we expect to see in the ’25 AFS – when they are eventually released? Is analysis of the AFS likely to produce opinion, yet again, that the company is insolvent?

And most important of all: is there any possibility, however tenuous, that the remaining debentures (2.2 Billion as of the ’24 AFS) will ever be repaid?

Following our post of 2 December there have been further exchanges involving Deon Pienaar and ADJP, CIPC and Western Cape High Court (WCHC) as well as ADJP, the SARB’s attorneys & CIPC and the intervention of an Assistant Deputy Judge President within DoJ (Department of Justice and Constitutional Affairs)

We also understand from posts by Deon Pienaar that the CIPC’s Investigation and the hoped for release of the Interim Report are on ice pending ADJP/DoJ outcomes from the information that has, at their invitation, been submitted to them by Deon, Cuma Zwane and others

This has prompted us to send a further email to Zwane which went out on Friday 12th with this content:

Hello Mr Zwane

There have been some interesting developments lately which prompt us to write to you again

From recent correspondence that has been on the go it seems quite apparent that SARB is the reason for the delay in CIPC’s releasing the Investigation’s Interim Report!

Our first impression from the Sarb Attorneys email of 12 November in response to your letter sent to the WCHC – was that SARB are stalling. Further, that the attorneys will have been instructed by SARB and thus it was the latter that a) made an extensive – but pointless? – argument about the non-release of the report and b) their inappropriate instruction to “cease your unlawful interference” without stating any authority per which they can issue such instruction and overlooking your statement in your letter to WCHC that CIPC has no intention of becoming involved (interference) in cases relevant but not directly related to, the PSPC shut-down

Then, in your letter to ADJP, it is pretty obvious that SARB are going to be named as the primary entity responsible for the PSPC shut-down (see attached copy of our Facebook and web site posts on this)

And, in his second letter to ADJP – attached in case you have not already seen it – Deon Pienaar has made definitive statements about SARB’s non-participation in the S41 co-operative process and also alleged (but true?) that they have not even committed to the further process by way of provision of an NDA undertaking

We know that you and Deon interact frequently and exchange information so it seems logical to say that this revealed situation viz a viz SARB has come to him from CIPC

Is this indeed the case and if so, what is to be done about it?

The ADJP’s interest (Justice Goliath?) is a very welcome surprise and although we don’t know how that came about, the big question is: where it will lead?

DoJ is also responsible for Constitutional Development meaning that they have authority over all Constitutional matters and can act regarding S41 issues – specifically, failure by organs of state to participate and co-operate?

This possibility suggests to us that there will be a very senior official within DoJ (ADJP or higher level?) who can address cases of non-participation in an S41 co-operative process and can take up the present matter with SARB and compel them to comply with their obligation as set out in S41?
Is such pressure to meet the Constitutional obligation likely to occur?
If SARB have been responsible for the delay in release of the Interim Report since the completion two years ago, and are now to be pressured to participate, how long is that going to take and how much more delay will it entail?
In his attached letter, Deon states at para 29 that “the approximate 80 000 investors, have been held hostage long enough” and the continuation of this situation is now attributable solely to SARB?
Are there now sufficient grounds to by-pass the required protocols and release the report and move the process forward without SARB, leaving them to deal with the resulting fall out as a consequence of their failure to be part of the process?
We hope that you’ll share information with us but completely understand if this is not possible
Thank you
Zwane has not responded to the email although we’re hoping that he will before CIPC shuts down for the festive season break
We also wait to hear about any actions taken by them as regards JP Tromp’s recent revelation of Nova’s machinations to circumvent the August 2022 prohibition on the disposal of assets and the Flora Centre loan on which they’ve reneged and offered to Capitec Bank Range View and Carletonville Centres in settlement thus, potentially, further reducing the company’s asset base with further negative impact on its prospects and ability to repay the debentures

Na aanleiding van ons plasing van 2 Desember was daar verdere uitruilings tussen Deon Pienaar en ADJP, CIPC en die Wes-Kaapse Hooggeregshof (WCHC), sowel as die ADJP, die SARB se prokureurs en CIPC, en die ingryping van ‘n Assistent-Adjunk-Regterpresident binne die DoJ (Departement van Justisie en Grondwetlike Sake)

Ons verstaan ​​ook uit plasings deur Deon Pienaar dat die CIPC se ondersoek en die verwagte vrystelling van die tussentydse verslag op ys geplaas is hangende die ADJP/DoJ-uitkomste van die inligting wat, op hul uitnodiging, deur Deon, Cuma Zwane en ander aan hulle voorgelê is

Dit het ons aangespoor om ‘n verdere e-pos aan Zwane te stuur wat op Vrydag die 12de uitgestuur is met hierdie inhoud:

>>>>>

Hello Mr Zwane

There have been some interesting developments lately which prompt us to write to you again

From recent correspondence that has been on the go it seems quite apparent that SARB is the reason for the delay in CIPC’s releasing the Investigation’s Interim Report!

Our first impression from the SARB Attorneys email of 12 November in response to your letter sent to the WCHC – was that SARB are stalling. Further, that the attorneys will have been instructed by SARB and thus it was the latter that a) made an extensive – but pointless? – argument about the non-release of the report and b) their inappropriate instruction to “cease your unlawful interference“ without stating any authority per which they can issue such instruction and overlooking your statement in your letter to WCHC that CIPC has no intention of becoming involved (interference) in cases relevant but not directly related to, the PSPC shut-down

Then, in your letter to ADJP, it is pretty obvious that SARB are going to be named as the primary entity responsible for the PSPC shut-down (see attached copy of our Facebook and web site posts on this)

And, in his second letter to ADJP – attached in case you have not already seen it – Deon Pienaar has made definitive statements about SARB’s non-participation in the S41 co-operative process and also alleged (but true?) that they have not even committed to the further process by way of provision of an NDA undertaking

We know that you and Deon interact frequently and exchange information so it seems logical to say that this revealed situation viz a viz SARB has come to him from CIPC

Is this indeed the case and if so, what is to be done about it?

The ADJP’s interest (Justice Goliath?) is a very welcome surprise and although we don’t know how that came about, the big question is: where it will lead?

DoJ is also responsible for Constitutional Development meaning that they have authority over all Constitutional matters and can act regarding S41 issues – specifically, failure by organs of state to participate and co-operate?

This possibility suggests to us that there will be a very senior official within DoJ (ADJP or higher level?) who can address cases of non-participation in an S41 co-operative process and can take up the present matter with SARB and compel them to comply with their obligation as set out in S41?
Is such pressure to meet the Constitutional obligation likely to occur?
If SARB have been responsible for the delay in release of the Interim Report since the completion two years ago, and are now to be pressured to participate, how long is that going to take and how much more delay will it entail?
In his attached letter, Deon states at para 29 that “the approximate 80 000 investors, have been held hostage long enough” and the continuation of this situation is now attributable solely to SARB?
Are there now sufficient grounds to by-pass the required protocols and release the report and move the process forward without SARB, leaving them to deal with the resulting fall out as a consequence of their failure to be part of the process?
We hope that you’ll share information with us but completely understand if this is not possible
>>>>>

Zwane het nie op die e-pos gereageer nie, alhoewel ons hoop dat hy dit sal doen voordat CIPC vir die feestydvakansie sluit

Ons wag ook om te hoor van enige stappe wat hulle geneem het rakende JP Tromp se onlangse onthulling van Nova se aksie om die verbod van Augustus 2022 op die verkoop van bates en die Flora Centre-lening, waarop hulle teruggetree het en aan Capitec Bank Range View en Carletonville Centres as skikking aangebied het, te omseil, wat moontlik die maatskappy se batebasis verder sal verminder met verdere negatiewe impak op sy vooruitsigte en vermoë om die skuldbriewe terug te betaal.