Op Donderdag 15 Januarie kon ons nie konnekteer nie en is ons via ‘n opspringboodskap op die skerm in kennis gestel dat: “Daar was ‘n kritieke fout op hierdie webwerf”. Teen Maandagoggend was toegang steeds nie moontlik nie

Wat beteken dit? Wat moet persone wat enige belang in Nova het hiervan maak? Wie sou hierdie belangstellendes wees? Die skuldbriewe en aandeelhouers natuurlik, maar ook ander krediteure, diensverskaffers, hul bankiers en moontlik selfs potensiële beleggers, hoe onwaarskynlik dit ook al mag wees

Hoe krities is hierdie gebeurtenis?

Was dit bloot ‘n tegniese saak? Is die maatskappy se internetdiens deur die betrokke diensverskaffer afgesny en, indien ja, waarom?

Of is dit deel van ‘n groot ontwikkeling of verandering wat nog gepubliseer moet word?
Wat beteken dit? Wat moet persone wat enige belang in Nova het hiervan maak? Wie sou hierdie belanghebbende persone wees? Die skuldbriewe en aandeelhouers natuurlik, maar ook ander krediteure, diensverskaffers, hul bankiers en moontlik selfs potensiële beleggers, hoe onwaarskynlik dit ook al mag wees

Of was dit deel van ‘n groot ontwikkeling of verandering wat nog nie gepubliseer is nie?

‘n Mens sou nie weet sonder enige kommunikasie van Nova nie, en dit sou nie onregverdig wees om te sê dat dit gelyk het of die skuldbriefhouers dalk weer eens in die duister gelaat word nie

Ons het Maandagoggend vir Nova ‘n e-pos gestuur na hul generiese e-posadres – gemerk vir die aandag van Raadsvoorsitter Myburgh – en gevra vir die rede waarom die webwerf ontoeganklik is

‘n Generiese antwoord is ontvang van ‘n persoon in die administrasie, wat verklaar dat die rede ‘n tegniese probleem was en kort na ontvangs van die e-pos was toegang tot die webwerf weer moontlik

Dit besweer nie ons kommer oor die moontlikheid van nog ‘n gebeurtenis wat dui op, eerstens, onstabiliteit binne die maatskappy, tweedens, dat niemand by Nova, so lyk dit, daaraan gedink het om ‘n openbare verklaring oor die onderbreking te maak nie en derdens, dat die generiese antwoord dalk ‘n dekmantelstorie is vir ‘n meer ernstige onderliggende situasie, waarvan die besonderhede nog bekend gemaak moet word

Paranoia? Gegewe die onthulde geskiedenis van aksies wat die skuldbriefhouers benadeel het sedert 2012, sal enige negatiewe gebeurtenis met agterdog bejeën word

Die e-posse waarna verwys word, kan hier gelees word: www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260121-2 en hier: www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260121-1

On Thursday 15 January, we were unable to connect and we were informed via an on-screen pop-up message that: “There has been a critical error on this web site”. As of Monday morning access was still not possible

What does this mean? What are persons who have any interest in Nova to make of this? Who would, these interested persons be? The Debenture- and Shareholders of course but also other creditors, service providers, their bankers and possibly even potential investors, however unlikely that might be

How critical is this event?

Was it merely a technical matter? Has the company’s internet service been cut by the relevant service provider and if so, why?

Or, is it part of a major development or change that has yet to be publicized?

One wouldn’t know in the absence of any communication coming out of Nova, and it would not be unfair to state that it looked like the Debenture Holders were, perhaps, being left in the dark – yet again

We emailed Nova on Monday morning at their generic email address – marked for attention of Board Chair Myburgh – asking for the reason why the web site is inaccessible

A generic reply was received from a person in the administration, stating that the reason was a technical issue and shortly after receipt of the mail, access to the web site was again possible

It does not allay our concerns as to the possibility of yet another event that points to, firstly, instability within the company, secondly, that no one at Nova, it seems, thought to make a public statement on the outage and thirdly, that the generic reply might be a cover story for a more serious underlying situation, details of which have yet to be revealed

Paranoia? Given revealed history of actions detrimental to the Debenture Holders, since 2012, any negative event will be viewed with suspicion

The emails referred to can be read here:
<www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260121-2> www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260121-2
and here:
<www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260121-1> www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260121-1

Our apologies. We trust that no Del Judor (Highveld Witbank) Debenture Holder got heart palpitations on seeing the incorrect value

This means a change to the figures that we set out in the post and these now read:

Already lost or at risk: 192.7m
(Village Mall, Courtside, Carletonville & Carnival)

Zambezi and the Villa: 1,289.0 billion

Remaining commercial properties
Del Judor: 179.0.m
Flora Centre: 217.4m
Waterglen: 281.8m

Total remaining commercial assets: 678.2m. Up from 517.1m as previously stated, although, in the bigger picture and given the 1,963.9 billion of commercial property related debentures that must still be repaid, the slight increase doesn’t have much meaning

Again, apologies for the error

Ons vra om verskoning. Ons vertrou dat geen Del Judor (Highveld Witbank) Skuldbriefhouer hartkloppings gekry het toe hulle die verkeerde waarde gesien het nie

Dit beteken ‘n verandering aan die syfers wat ons in die plasing uiteengesit het, en dit lui nou:

Reeds verlore of in gevaar: 192.7 miljoen
(Village Mall, Courtside, Carletonville & Carnival)

Zambezi en die Villa: 1 289,0 miljard

Oorblywende kommersiële eiendomme
Del Judor: 179,0 miljoen
Flora-sentrum: 217,4 miljoen
Waterglen: 281,8 miljoen

Totale oorblywende kommersiële bates: 678.2 miljoen. Op vanaf 517.1 miljoen soos voorheen genoem, hoewel, in die groter prentjie en gegewe die 1 963.9 miljard aan kommersiële eiendomsverwante skuldbriewe wat nog terugbetaal moet word, die relatief klein toename nie veel betekenis het nie

Weereens, verskoning vir die fout

Dit kan hier gelees word: novapropertygroup.co.za/index.php/communiques/#flipbook-df_6497/1/

Dit verskaf inligting oor die nege oorblywende kommersiële eiendomme in die portefeulje, insluitend:

– inligting oor die Amogela/Liberty Mall in Welkom wat in 2021 verkoop is en in Desember van daardie jaar in die naam van die nuwe eienaar oorgedra is maar waarvoor betaling nooit ontvang is nie (Sien Nova Debenture Trustee JP Tromp se uiteensetting oor hierdie eiendom by www.carian.co.za/post/debentures-linked-to-amogela-mall-liberty-mall )

– die voorlopige likwidasie van Flora Centre weens wanbetaling op ‘n lening, maar sonder enige melding van hul plan, in weerwil van die CIPC-embargo op die verkoop van eiendomsbates, om die Carletonville- en Carnival Centre-eiendomme in skikking aan te bied (op te offer) en sodoende die likwidasie te ontsnap en die waardevoller eiendom te behou (Sien ons plasing van 28 November oor Flora Centre op beide die webwerf en die Facebook-blad)

Dit is betekenisvol dat hulle geen inligting verskaf oor die oorblywende (bly hulle inderdaad op die boeke?) sewe residensiële ontwikkelingseiendomme soos ook die geval was in hul vorige kommunikasie van Desember 2023 nie (alhoewel daardie een wel inhoud oor Theresapark gehad het – welke vals inhoud slegs teenwoordig was om punte te verdien oor die CIPC-bateverkopingsembargo wat, volgens hulle, ontwikkelingsfinansiering ingeperk het)

Wat sê dit eintlik vir ons? Miskien stel ons e-pos wat aan Cuma Zwane van CIPC gestuur is, waarin ons ‘n afskrif van die Kommuniké aan hom gestuur het, wat die algemene vlak van aanvaarding en geloof sal wees. Lees hier: www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-1

Natuurlik, ‘n Kommunikasie, waarvan die doel duidelik is om ‘n prentjie te bied van ‘n lewensvatbare maatskappy wat in die belang van die Skuldbriefhouers – sy primêre skuldeiser – werk (en hopelik daardie Sharemax-beleggers wat in 2010/11 gekies het om aandeelhouers te word) dien geen nut wanneer die laaste jaarlikse finansiële state wat gepubliseer is (vir die einde van 2024) ‘n prentjie toon wat gebaseer is op die maatskappyinligting wat soveel as drie jaar oud is – wat beteken verouderd. Die 2025-jaarlikse finansiële state is nog nie gepubliseer nie en Nova gaan voort (in die Kommunikasie) om sy standpunt te regverdig dat die Maatskappywet nie publikasie binne ses maande na die einde van die finansiële jaar vereis nie

Ons gebruik hierdie plasing om ‘n prentjie te skets van die vlak van risiko wat die maatskappy en die Skuldbriefhouers tans in die gesig staar:

Eerstens, hou in gedagte dat die “Missing 414 million” – die eiendomme is wat voorheen verkoop is sonder ooreenstemmende skuldbriefterugbetaling (Sien JP Tromp se plasing hieroor by www.carian.co.za/post/the-missing-r-414-694-327) in die nastrewing van Nova se “Optimal Value Enhancement for Debenture Holders through redeployment of proceeds of disposed of properties ito Nova’s Capital Growth Strategy” – ‘n strategie wat klaaglik misluk het, miskien doelbewus!

Van die nege kommersiële eiendomme wat in die portefeulje oorbly, gebaseer op die ’24 AFS-inhoud (maar nou twee jaar verouderd), is die volgende reeds weg of in gevaar:

Village Mall: ’24 AFS-waarde = 42.6 miljoen – Die eiendom is in beslag geneem en verkoop ingevolge ‘n hofuitspraak in die Beneficio-lenings saak
Courtside Centre: 66.6 miljoen – ook verlore uit die Beneficio-lening
Carletonville Centre: 53.8 miljoen – moontlik verlore onder Nova se wanbetalings van die Flora Centre-lening en aangebied aan die finansieringsbank as gedeeltelike skikking
Carnival Centre: 29.7 miljoen – soortgelyk aan Carletonville

Totale batewaarde verlore of in gevaar: 192.7 miljoen

Voeg hierby die skynbaar hopelose/”basket case” van:

Zambezi/Tshwane China Mall: 539.0 miljoen
The Villa: 750.0 miljoen

Batewaarde in gevaar: 1 289.0 miljard

Klik hier vir ‘n onlangse Daily Investor-artikel oor Zambezi: www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-3

Klik hier vir ‘n video oor Die Villa-dop (of, die “eyesore”, waaroor daar gereelde mediaklagtes is): www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-2

Watter bates sal beskikbaar bly om uiteindelik skuldbriefterugbetaling te verskaf?

Del Judor: 17.9 miljoen
Flora-sentrum: 217.4 miljoen
Waterglen: 281.8 miljoen

Totale oorblywende kommersiële bates: 517.1 miljoen

Sal hierdie waarde van bates ooit in staat wees om terugbetaling van kommersiële eiendomsverwante skuldbriewe ter waarde van 1 963,9 miljard (volgens die ’24 AFS) te verskaf?

(Ons het die residensiële ontwikkelingseiendomme en verwante skuldbriewe in hierdie plasing uitgesluit weens die minimale inligting in die ’24 AFS en die totale gebrek aan enige inligting in die jongste Kommunikasie)

So, wat is Nova se vooruitsigte vir hierdie jaar? Kan enigiemand argumenteer dat die maatskappy lewensvatbaar en ‘n lopende saak (going concern) is? Wat kan ons verwag om te sien in die ’25 AFS – wanneer hulle uiteindelik vrygestel word? Sal ‘n ontleding van die AFS waarskynlik weereens die mening lewer dat die maatskappy insolvent is?

En die belangrikste van alles: is daar enige moontlikheid, al hoe skraal, dat die oorblywende skuldbriewe (2.2 miljard vanaf die ’24 AFS) ooit terugbetaal sal word?

* information on the Amogela/Liberty Mall in Welkom which was sold in 2021and transferred into the name of the new owner in December of that year but for which payment has never been received (See Nova Debenture Trustee JP Tromp’s exposé on this property at <www.carian.co.za/post/debentures-linked-to-amogela-mall-liberty-mal l> www.carian.co.za/post/debentures-linked-to-amogela-mall-liberty-mall )

* the provisional liquidation of Flora Centre because of default on a loan but without any mention of their ploy, in defiance of the CIPC embargo on property asset disposal, to offer(sacrifice) the Carletonville and Carnival Centre properties in settlement and thus escape the liquidation and retain the more valuable property (See our 28 November post on Flora Centre in both the web site and the Facebook page)

Significantly, if provides no information on the remaining (do they indeed remain on the books?) seven residential development properties as was also the case in their previous Communiqué of December 2023 (although that one did have content on Theresapark – which spurious content was only present to score points about the CIPC asset disposal embargo having, they said, canned development finance)

What does it actually tell us? Perhaps our email sent to Cuma Zwane at CIPC, forwarding a copy of the Communiqué to him, states what the general level of acceptance and belief will be. Read here: <www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-1> www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-1

Of course, a Communiqué, the purpose of which is, clearly, to present a picture of a viable company working in the interests of the Debenture Holders – its primary creditor – (and hopefully, those Sharemax investors who opted to become Shareholders back in 2010/11) serves no point when the last annual financial statements published (for year-end 2024) show a picture which is based on the company information that is as much as three years old – meaning out of date. The 2025 AFS are as yet, unpublished and Nova continues (in the Communique) to justify its stance that the Companies Act does not require publication within six months after financial year-end

We use this post to sketch a picture of the level of risk that the company and the Debenture Holders are currently facing:

Firstly, bear in mind the “Missing 414 million” being the properties previously sold without corresponding debenture repayment (See JP Tromp’s post on this at <www.carian.co.za/post/the-missing-r-414-694-327> www.carian.co.za/post/the-missing-r-414-694-327) in pursuit of Nova’s “Optimal Value Enhancement for Debenture Holders through redeployment of proceeds of disposed of properties ito Nova’s Capital Growth Strategy” – a strategy that has failed miserably, perhaps deliberately so!

Of the nine commercial properties that remain in the portfolio, based on the ’24 AFS content (but two years out of date now), the following are already gone or at risk:

Village Mall: ’24 AFS value = 42.6m – attached under the defaulted Beneficio loan judgements
Courtside Centre: 66.6m – also lost out of the Beneficio loan
Carletonville Centre: 53.8m – potentially lost under Nova’s defaulted Flora Centre loan and offered to the financing bank as part settlement
Carnival Centre: 29.7m – likewise as for Carletonville

Total asset value lost or at risk: 192.7m

Add to these the apparently hopeless/basket cases of:

Zambezi/Tshwane China Mall: 539.0m
The Villa: 750.0m

Asset value at risk: 1,289.0 Billion

Click here for a recent Daily Investor article on Zambezi: <www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-3> www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-3
Click here for a video on The Villa shell (or, the eyesore, about which there are frequent media complaints): <www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-2> www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-2

What assets will be left available to eventually provide Debenture repayment?

Del Judor: 17.9m
Flora Centre: 217.4m
Waterglen: 281.8m

Total remaining commercial assets: 517.1m

Is this value of assets ever going to be able to provide repayment of commercial property related debentures to the value of 1,963.9 BilIion as per the ’24 AFS?

(We Have excluded addressing the residential development properties and related debentures in this post due to the minimal information contained in the ’24 AFS and the total lack of any information in the latest Communiqué)

So, what are Nova’s prospects for this year? Can anyone argue that the company is viable and a going concern? What can we expect to see in the ’25 AFS – when they are eventually released? Is analysis of the AFS likely to produce opinion, yet again, that the company is insolvent?

And most important of all: is there any possibility, however tenuous, that the remaining debentures (2.2 Billion as of the ’24 AFS) will ever be repaid?