Dit kan hier gelees word: novapropertygroup.co.za/index.php/communiques/#flipbook-df_6497/1/

Dit verskaf inligting oor die nege oorblywende kommersiële eiendomme in die portefeulje, insluitend:

– inligting oor die Amogela/Liberty Mall in Welkom wat in 2021 verkoop is en in Desember van daardie jaar in die naam van die nuwe eienaar oorgedra is maar waarvoor betaling nooit ontvang is nie (Sien Nova Debenture Trustee JP Tromp se uiteensetting oor hierdie eiendom by www.carian.co.za/post/debentures-linked-to-amogela-mall-liberty-mall )

– die voorlopige likwidasie van Flora Centre weens wanbetaling op ‘n lening, maar sonder enige melding van hul plan, in weerwil van die CIPC-embargo op die verkoop van eiendomsbates, om die Carletonville- en Carnival Centre-eiendomme in skikking aan te bied (op te offer) en sodoende die likwidasie te ontsnap en die waardevoller eiendom te behou (Sien ons plasing van 28 November oor Flora Centre op beide die webwerf en die Facebook-blad)

Dit is betekenisvol dat hulle geen inligting verskaf oor die oorblywende (bly hulle inderdaad op die boeke?) sewe residensiële ontwikkelingseiendomme soos ook die geval was in hul vorige kommunikasie van Desember 2023 nie (alhoewel daardie een wel inhoud oor Theresapark gehad het – welke vals inhoud slegs teenwoordig was om punte te verdien oor die CIPC-bateverkopingsembargo wat, volgens hulle, ontwikkelingsfinansiering ingeperk het)

Wat sê dit eintlik vir ons? Miskien stel ons e-pos wat aan Cuma Zwane van CIPC gestuur is, waarin ons ‘n afskrif van die Kommuniké aan hom gestuur het, wat die algemene vlak van aanvaarding en geloof sal wees. Lees hier: www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-1

Natuurlik, ‘n Kommunikasie, waarvan die doel duidelik is om ‘n prentjie te bied van ‘n lewensvatbare maatskappy wat in die belang van die Skuldbriefhouers – sy primêre skuldeiser – werk (en hopelik daardie Sharemax-beleggers wat in 2010/11 gekies het om aandeelhouers te word) dien geen nut wanneer die laaste jaarlikse finansiële state wat gepubliseer is (vir die einde van 2024) ‘n prentjie toon wat gebaseer is op die maatskappyinligting wat soveel as drie jaar oud is – wat beteken verouderd. Die 2025-jaarlikse finansiële state is nog nie gepubliseer nie en Nova gaan voort (in die Kommunikasie) om sy standpunt te regverdig dat die Maatskappywet nie publikasie binne ses maande na die einde van die finansiële jaar vereis nie

Ons gebruik hierdie plasing om ‘n prentjie te skets van die vlak van risiko wat die maatskappy en die Skuldbriefhouers tans in die gesig staar:

Eerstens, hou in gedagte dat die “Missing 414 million” – die eiendomme is wat voorheen verkoop is sonder ooreenstemmende skuldbriefterugbetaling (Sien JP Tromp se plasing hieroor by www.carian.co.za/post/the-missing-r-414-694-327) in die nastrewing van Nova se “Optimal Value Enhancement for Debenture Holders through redeployment of proceeds of disposed of properties ito Nova’s Capital Growth Strategy” – ‘n strategie wat klaaglik misluk het, miskien doelbewus!

Van die nege kommersiële eiendomme wat in die portefeulje oorbly, gebaseer op die ’24 AFS-inhoud (maar nou twee jaar verouderd), is die volgende reeds weg of in gevaar:

Village Mall: ’24 AFS-waarde = 42.6 miljoen – Die eiendom is in beslag geneem en verkoop ingevolge ‘n hofuitspraak in die Beneficio-lenings saak
Courtside Centre: 66.6 miljoen – ook verlore uit die Beneficio-lening
Carletonville Centre: 53.8 miljoen – moontlik verlore onder Nova se wanbetalings van die Flora Centre-lening en aangebied aan die finansieringsbank as gedeeltelike skikking
Carnival Centre: 29.7 miljoen – soortgelyk aan Carletonville

Totale batewaarde verlore of in gevaar: 192.7 miljoen

Voeg hierby die skynbaar hopelose/”basket case” van:

Zambezi/Tshwane China Mall: 539.0 miljoen
The Villa: 750.0 miljoen

Batewaarde in gevaar: 1 289.0 miljard

Klik hier vir ‘n onlangse Daily Investor-artikel oor Zambezi: www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-3

Klik hier vir ‘n video oor Die Villa-dop (of, die “eyesore”, waaroor daar gereelde mediaklagtes is): www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-2

Watter bates sal beskikbaar bly om uiteindelik skuldbriefterugbetaling te verskaf?

Del Judor: 17.9 miljoen
Flora-sentrum: 217.4 miljoen
Waterglen: 281.8 miljoen

Totale oorblywende kommersiële bates: 517.1 miljoen

Sal hierdie waarde van bates ooit in staat wees om terugbetaling van kommersiële eiendomsverwante skuldbriewe ter waarde van 1 963,9 miljard (volgens die ’24 AFS) te verskaf?

(Ons het die residensiële ontwikkelingseiendomme en verwante skuldbriewe in hierdie plasing uitgesluit weens die minimale inligting in die ’24 AFS en die totale gebrek aan enige inligting in die jongste Kommunikasie)

So, wat is Nova se vooruitsigte vir hierdie jaar? Kan enigiemand argumenteer dat die maatskappy lewensvatbaar en ‘n lopende saak (going concern) is? Wat kan ons verwag om te sien in die ’25 AFS – wanneer hulle uiteindelik vrygestel word? Sal ‘n ontleding van die AFS waarskynlik weereens die mening lewer dat die maatskappy insolvent is?

En die belangrikste van alles: is daar enige moontlikheid, al hoe skraal, dat die oorblywende skuldbriewe (2.2 miljard vanaf die ’24 AFS) ooit terugbetaal sal word?

* information on the Amogela/Liberty Mall in Welkom which was sold in 2021and transferred into the name of the new owner in December of that year but for which payment has never been received (See Nova Debenture Trustee JP Tromp’s exposé on this property at <www.carian.co.za/post/debentures-linked-to-amogela-mall-liberty-mal l> www.carian.co.za/post/debentures-linked-to-amogela-mall-liberty-mall )

* the provisional liquidation of Flora Centre because of default on a loan but without any mention of their ploy, in defiance of the CIPC embargo on property asset disposal, to offer(sacrifice) the Carletonville and Carnival Centre properties in settlement and thus escape the liquidation and retain the more valuable property (See our 28 November post on Flora Centre in both the web site and the Facebook page)

Significantly, if provides no information on the remaining (do they indeed remain on the books?) seven residential development properties as was also the case in their previous Communiqué of December 2023 (although that one did have content on Theresapark – which spurious content was only present to score points about the CIPC asset disposal embargo having, they said, canned development finance)

What does it actually tell us? Perhaps our email sent to Cuma Zwane at CIPC, forwarding a copy of the Communiqué to him, states what the general level of acceptance and belief will be. Read here: <www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-1> www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-1

Of course, a Communiqué, the purpose of which is, clearly, to present a picture of a viable company working in the interests of the Debenture Holders – its primary creditor – (and hopefully, those Sharemax investors who opted to become Shareholders back in 2010/11) serves no point when the last annual financial statements published (for year-end 2024) show a picture which is based on the company information that is as much as three years old – meaning out of date. The 2025 AFS are as yet, unpublished and Nova continues (in the Communique) to justify its stance that the Companies Act does not require publication within six months after financial year-end

We use this post to sketch a picture of the level of risk that the company and the Debenture Holders are currently facing:

Firstly, bear in mind the “Missing 414 million” being the properties previously sold without corresponding debenture repayment (See JP Tromp’s post on this at <www.carian.co.za/post/the-missing-r-414-694-327> www.carian.co.za/post/the-missing-r-414-694-327) in pursuit of Nova’s “Optimal Value Enhancement for Debenture Holders through redeployment of proceeds of disposed of properties ito Nova’s Capital Growth Strategy” – a strategy that has failed miserably, perhaps deliberately so!

Of the nine commercial properties that remain in the portfolio, based on the ’24 AFS content (but two years out of date now), the following are already gone or at risk:

Village Mall: ’24 AFS value = 42.6m – attached under the defaulted Beneficio loan judgements
Courtside Centre: 66.6m – also lost out of the Beneficio loan
Carletonville Centre: 53.8m – potentially lost under Nova’s defaulted Flora Centre loan and offered to the financing bank as part settlement
Carnival Centre: 29.7m – likewise as for Carletonville

Total asset value lost or at risk: 192.7m

Add to these the apparently hopeless/basket cases of:

Zambezi/Tshwane China Mall: 539.0m
The Villa: 750.0m

Asset value at risk: 1,289.0 Billion

Click here for a recent Daily Investor article on Zambezi: <www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-3> www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-3
Click here for a video on The Villa shell (or, the eyesore, about which there are frequent media complaints): <www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-2> www.ndcag.co.za/go/20260112-2

What assets will be left available to eventually provide Debenture repayment?

Del Judor: 17.9m
Flora Centre: 217.4m
Waterglen: 281.8m

Total remaining commercial assets: 517.1m

Is this value of assets ever going to be able to provide repayment of commercial property related debentures to the value of 1,963.9 BilIion as per the ’24 AFS?

(We Have excluded addressing the residential development properties and related debentures in this post due to the minimal information contained in the ’24 AFS and the total lack of any information in the latest Communiqué)

So, what are Nova’s prospects for this year? Can anyone argue that the company is viable and a going concern? What can we expect to see in the ’25 AFS – when they are eventually released? Is analysis of the AFS likely to produce opinion, yet again, that the company is insolvent?

And most important of all: is there any possibility, however tenuous, that the remaining debentures (2.2 Billion as of the ’24 AFS) will ever be repaid?